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Abstract
Global knowledge spillovers allow backward countries to catch up by accumulating
knowledge faster than leading countries. International growth differentials will fall as
diminishing returns with respect to the national knowledge stock apply. The domestic
growth rate will finally equal the world-wide growth rate, which is endogenous if constant
returns apply with respect to all world knowledge stocks taken together. 
In our two-country two-sector model with firm-specific knowledge, we show that there is
convergence to a symmetric steady state under balanced trade. Under perfect mobility of
financial capital, however, there is leapfrogging in the sense that the initially backward
country reaches a higher productivity level in the steady state than the initially leading
country. This leapfrogging result is found for countries that are perfectly symmetric in all
respects except for initial knowledge stocks. The result is therefore path-dependent,
implying that overtaking is higher the larger the initial productivity gap. The existence of a
nontradables sector is driving the result. During the catch-up process, the backward
economy accumulates a foreign debt to smooth consumption. To service this debt, labor is
shifted from nontradables to tradables production and investment in firm-specific
knowledge.
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1. Introduction
Low per capita income countries may catch up under suitable conditions. In the neoclassical
theory of economic growth low income levels are associated with relative capital scarcity.
By investing their own savings, backward countries may realize a growth rate that is
temporarily higher than in the steady state. However, convergence in terms of GDP per
capita is conditioned by the structural characteristics of each country. Things are quite
different under perfect international capital mobility. Then backward countries adjust
without delay and attain the common level of GDP per capita in the world economy.
These results are clearly at odds with the facts, which can be explained in two ways.
Either international capital mobility does not matter in reality or the neoclassical theory in
its strictest form must be rejected. There are good reasons to take international capital
mobility in the past as well as in the present seriously. As observed by Taylor (1996),
international capital mobility played an important role in the nineteenth century processes
of convergence and divergence. In modern times we witness a substantial integration of
international capital markets with funds flowing to rapidly growing economies. As a
consequence, the challenge lies on the theoretical level.
There are two ways to proceed. One can adjust the neoclassical theory or look for
an alternative. The first route is followed in Barro, Romer and Sala-i-Martin (1992), who
introduce a form of  imperfect international capital mobility by assuming that foreign
borrowing for investment in human capital is not feasible. Human capital cannot be used as
collateral for international borrowing. Therefore, the amount of foreign debt cannot exceed
the value of physical capital. Countries which are credit-constrained in this sense
convergence to their steady state gradually, but at a higher speed than in the case of a
closed economy.
Buiter and Kletzer (1991) follow the second route by providing a theoretical
alternative for the neoclassical model. In their view there are important local or homegrown
inputs (like different modes of infrastructure), which are essential for the production
process. To capture this idea the authors introduce a non-traded capital good (“human
capital”) produced with a non-traded input (labour) that has an alternative use in
consumption. In the Buiter-Kletzer model countries can realize different long-run growth
rates of output per worker because growth rates of human capital per worker may be
different. However, Buiter and Kletzer (1991) acknowledge that their assumptions capture
but very partially the notion of a homegrown infrastructure.
In Turnovsky and Sen (1995), instantaneous adjustment under capital mobility is
prevented by the introduction of a non-tradables sector that provides for capital goods in the
domestic economy. The rate of investment remains finite because production is subject to
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increasing marginal costs.
In this paper, we show that nontradables have a fundamental effect on international
productivity convergence under capital mobity. In contrast with Turnovsky and Sen (1995),
we focus on the role of nontraded consumption goods (which can be interpreted as leisure).
Production of tradables requires, apart from labour, knowledge inputs which are strictly
firm-specific and therefore nontradable as well. Each firm has to accumulate its own
knowledge stock by employing labour in R&D activities. The assumption that the stock of
knowledge capital is immobile (or homegrown) while financial capital is perfectly mobile is
sufficient to avoid the implication of the neoclassical model that adjustment of income
levels is instantaneous.
The existence of nontradable consumption goods crucially affects long-run relative
productivity levels. Capital mobility allows poor countries to smooth consumption and
attract foreign savings to finance their investment. Long-run consumption, both of tradables
and nontradables, as a fraction of national product is lower because of the burden of
interest payments on the foreign debt that is accumulated. Other things equal, demand for
nontradable consumption goods is lower in a debtor country than in a country holding net
foreign assets so that the former has more domestic resources (labour) available for
accumulation. In our two-country model, the initially poor country grows faster than the
rich country, accumulates foreign debt, and continues to grow faster when it has reached
the rich country productivity level. Leapfrogging in terms of productivity levels is the
result.
International knowledge spillovers in the R&D process explain why the formerly
backward economy does not grow faster than the rich one indefinitely. A steady state with
equal growth rates in both countries arises since a faster growing country will benefit
proportionally less and less from foreign spillovers while the opposite holds for the slower
growing country. From the point of view of a single country, there are diminishing returns
with respect to the accumulation of knowledge, and in the long run the domestic rate of
growth equals the world growth rate. However, we also assume that there are constant
returns to scale in the R&D process with respect to domestic and foreign knowledge taken
together. Hence, the rate of growth of the world economy is endogenous.
We find that the long-run world growth rate as well as the world distribution of
productivity depends on the initial distribution of productivity and financial wealth. To
sharpen the analysis we abstract from all other sources of long-run productivity differences.
The more unequal the initial distribution of productivity is, and the more skewed the initial
distribution of financial wealth is towards high productivity countries, the more
leapfrogging arises and the more world growth is affected. (With small international
spillovers and high substitution between tradables from different countries, world growth is
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adversely affected). Initial positions are therefore more important than is assumed in
traditional convergence models.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present separately the structural
and behavioural relationships of the model. Section 3 is devoted to a discussion of the
steady-state properties of the system. Dynamic aspects for different balance of payments
regimes are considered in Section 4 by using a linearized version of the model. In Section 5
the implications of the model are illustrated by presenting and discussing numerical
examples. The final section summarizes the main conclusions of the analysis. Algebraic
derivations are relegated to appendices.
2. A two-country endogenous growth model 
2.1. Structure of the model
There are two countries that are characterized by identical preferences, technological
opportunities, and primary factor endowments. However, one country, indexed by
superscript 1, starts at a lower productivity level than country 2. Each country has one
primary factor of production in fixed supply (labour), which is allocated over two sectors,
tradables and non-tradables. Non-tradables are homogenous. Tradables are differentiated
and each variety is produced by a single monopolistic firm. These firms control and
accumulate firm-specific knowledge (as in Smulders and Van de Klundert, 1995). Within
each country, there is a continuum of symmetric firms on the unit interval. This allows us
to save on notation by formulating the model for a single representative firm.
The structural relationship are given in Table A. Countries are denoted by
superscript i =  1, 2 (and if necessary also by superscript j for the other country). Each line
in the table represents two equations, one for each country. Eqs. (A.1) tells that one unit of
labour LY produces one unit of tradables Y. Labour productivity in the tradables sector is
denoted by h as appears from eqs. (A.2), relating output X to input LX. 
Firms have an opportunity to increase labour productivity h by performing R&D
according to eqs. (A.3). Knowledge can be increased by allocating labour (LR) to R&D.
Productivity in the R&D division depends on a fixed coefficient > and a knowledge
component consisting of three elements. First, firms build upon specific knowledge
accumulated in the past. Second, all firms benefit from knowledge spillovers emanating
from domestic firms. Third, there are knowledge spillovers from abroad. Knowledge
spillovers relate to the average level of knowledge in the different economies (h̄).
Productivity levels may differ across countries, but are identical across firms within a
country. For this reason average knowledge levels are equal to the knowledge levels of
4
firms in each country (h̄i=hi). 
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Table A Structural relationships
Technology
   Non-tradables sector
Y i = LY
i (A.1)
   Tradables sector
X i = hi Lx
i (A.2)
(A.3)0h i ' > (h i)1&"h&"f (h i)"h(h j)"f L iR
Preferences
(A.4)U i(0) ' m
4
0
lnC i(t) e &ht dt
(A.5)C i ' (C iX)
F (C iY)
1&F
(A.6)C iX ' (D
i)(g&1)/g % (M i)(g&1)/g g / (g&1)
Market clearing
Y i = CY
i (A.7)




i = L (A.9)
Symbols
C aggregate consumption index h labour productivity
tradables
CX consumption index tradables L labour supply
CY consumption non-tradables Lk labour allocated in
sector/division k
6
D consumption domestically produced (k = Y, X, R)
tradables M imported tradables
All equations apply to i=1,2 and jÖi.
     1 Alternatively, CY can be interpreted as leisure.
     2 The maximization problem of firm k in country i can be represented by the following
Hamiltonian , whereH k ' p k (X k ; @)X k & w i (X k /h k%L kR ) % p
k
h > (h
k)1&"h&"f (h̄ i)"h (h̄ j)"f L kR
pk(·) is the firm's demand function, see (B.4), X/h=Lx is labour employed in production, see (A.2),
the term in square brackets is firm-specific knowledge accumulation 0h, see (A.3), and ph is the co-
state variable. The firm's instruments are Xk and LR
k and it controls state variable hk.
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Intertemporal preferences in the consumption index C are given in eqs. (A.4).
Infinitely-lived households apply a constant utility discount rate h. The relative rate of risk
aversion is unity as appears from the logarithmic instantaneous utility function. The choice
of tradables versus non-tradables is governed by a Cobb Douglas preference function as
shown in eqs. (A.5). Consumption of non-tradables (CY) relates to homogenous products.
1
The consumption index of tradables (Cx) combines consumption of domestically produced
varieties (D) and imported varieties (M) by way of a CES sub-utility function, with an
elasticity of substitution denoted by g, eqs. (A.6). 
Markets for non-tradables clear, eqs. (A.7). So do all markets for tradables, eqs.
(A.8). The supply of labour (L) equals total demand for labour, as written down in eqs.
(A.9). 
2.2. Consumer and firm behaviour
The behavioural equations of our model are summarized in Table B. Consumers maximize
intertemporal utility over an infinite horizon. The decision problem consists of three stages
subject to the usual budget constraints. In the first stage, each consumer decides on the path
of aggregate consumption over time. This gives rise to the familiar Ramsey rule, shown in
eqs. (B.1). The growth rate of consumption equals the difference between the real
consumption rate of interest and the pure rate of time preference. In the second stage total
expenditure on consumption is divided over non-tradables, eqs. (B.2), and tradables, eqs.
(B.3). In the third stage consumers decide about spending the amount of money reserved
for tradables on domestically produced varieties, eqs. (B.4) and foreign varieties, eqs.
(B.5). The price elasticity of demand is equal to g in all cases considered. Eqs. (B.6) and
(B.7) define respectively the price index of tradables and the price index of aggregate
consumption.
Producers maximize the value of firm over an infinite horizon. Each firm faces a
downward sloped total demand function for its products as appears from eqs. (B.4) and
(B.5). Profit maximization implies that firms set a mark-up over (marginal) cost equal to
g/(g!1), as in eqs. (B.8). Labour demand for R&D follows from setting marginal revenue
(>Kph) equal to marginal cost (w), eqs. (B.9). The shadow price of firm-specific knowledge
ph is introduced as a Lagrangian multiplier in the maximization procedure.
2 Firms face a
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trade-off with respect to investing in specific knowledge as appears from the arbitrage
conditions (B.10). These conditions say that investing an amount of money equal to ph in
the capital market (the RHS of
Table B Behavioural relationships
Consumer behaviour









X ' F C
i p ic
(B.4)D i ' C iX p
i /pX
&g












Producers behaviour tradables sector


















where K i / (h i)1&"h&"f (h i)"h (h j)"f
Producers behaviour non-tradables sector
(B.11)p iY ' w
i
Balance of payments
(B.12)X ip i & FC ip ic % r
iA i ' 0A i
Symbols
A net foreign assets pc price index consumption
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r nominal interest rate pX world price index tradables
w wage rate ph firm's shadow price of knowledge
p price of tradables
All equations apply to i=1,2 and jÖi.
B.10) should yield the same revenue as investing that same amount of money in knowledge
creation. The latter raises labour productivity in the tradables sector and hence revenue in
this sector (first term on the LHS of B.10), it raises also the knowledge base in R&D
(second term) and it yields a capital gain (last term). In the non-tradables sector perfect
competition prevails. As a consequence, the price of non-tradables equals wage cost per
unit of output, eqs. (B.11). 
Finally, eqs. (B.12) imply that domestic net savings are invested in net foreign
assets (A). Domestic savings are the sum of two components. First, foreign assets increase
with the difference between the revenue from the production of tradables and the amount
spent on the consumption of tradables, i.e. with the trade balance. Second, interest
payments on existing foreign assets add to the amount available for investing in the
international capital market. It should be observed that under perfect capital mobility the
rate of interest is uniform across countries (r1= r2). At the other extreme there is the case
of balaced trade or zero mobility implying A = 0. Both regimes with respect to the balance
of payments will be analysed in the paper.
2.3. Semi-reduced model
The model exhibits constant returns to scale in the reproducible factors h1 and h2, see (A.3).





' R iL iR
where . (2)R i ' > h i /h j &"f
Note that R&D employment LR is a decision variable for the firm and is determined by
profit maximization. The productivity of R&D employment, Ri, depends on the ratio of
knowledge levels or productivity ratio. A country with relatively low productivity (hi/hj<1)
benefits from relatively more international spillovers and therefore realizes a higher growth
rate for a given amount of labour in R&D. This explains how backward countries may
catch up. Note that hi/hj is given by history. Since knowledge is firm-specific, firms have to
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accumulate their own knowledge which takes time. Hence, even if firms are allowed to
borrow in a perfect international capital market, there is no immediate adjustment of
international productivity levels. 
To further analyse the properties of the model, it is convenient to reduce the system
to the set of key relationships which is presented in Table C. Eqs. (C.1) relate to the
familiar Ramsey rules for optimal saving. Variables with a hat refer to growth rates. The
arbitrage rule which governs investment decisions by firms is in the background of the
reduced-forms (C.2). Labour market equilibrium is rewritten in eqs. (C.3). The third term
on the LHS represents labour allocated to R&D activities as follows from (1) and (2).
According to (C.4), the market for non-tradables is in equilibrium if non-tradables
production (LHS) equals demand which equals the fraction (1!F) of total consumption
expenditures divided by the price of nontradables. The latter equals the wage which can be
written in terms of the tradables price if (B.8) is taken into account. The balance of
payments conditions in their reduced form are given in eqs. (C.5). The LHS represents the
trade balance deflated by the wage rate w. Eqs. (A.2) and (B.8) have been substituted in
(B.12) to derive this expression. Relative prices of tradables in eq. (C.6) depend on relative
supply and price elasticity g. According to eq. (C.7), accumulated assets of the one country
are mirrored by accumulated debts of the other country. Eq. (C.8) directly follows from
(B.8) and shows that relative real wages reflect relative productivity. 




i/pi, Ai/w i (i = 1, 2), s, w1/w2, and p1/p2. The additional equation thatr i& p̂ i
closes the model depends on the balance of payment regime. In case of perfect international
capital mobility, interest rates are equal. Without capital mobility, net foreign assets are
zero:
r 1 = r 2  (capital mobility)   or   A1 = 0  (balanced trade). (3)
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Table C Key relationships
Ramsey rule
i=1,2 (C.1)Ĉ i ' (r i& p̂ i) & (p̂ ic & p̂
i) & h
where p̂1c & p̂
1 ' (1&F) ĥ 1 % F (1&s) ( p̂ 2&p̂ 1 )
p̂ 2c & p̂
2 ' (1&F) ĥ 2 % Fs ( p̂ 1&p̂ 2 )
s ' 1
1 % (p 1 /p 2)g&1
Investment decision




' r i & p̂ i
Labour market equilibrium




> h i /h j &"f
' L
Equilibrium in the market for nontradables
















& r i A
i
w i




























In all equations jÖi
3. Foreign debt, technological leadership and growth in the steady state.
A steady state is characterized by a fixed allocation of labour among the various activities.
The productivity levels in the domestic and foreign tradables sector grow at the same rate,




























We now use the key relationships in Table C and the steady state results above to
examine how long-run growth g and relative productivity hi/h j are related to (a given level
of) net foreign assets. First, we combine (C.1) and (C.2) to represent an equilibrium in the
(national) capital market in which the required rate of return given by (C.1) equals the
realized rate of return given by (C.2). In the steady state this can be written as:
i=1,2 (6)R iL ix ' h % ("f%"h)g
     3 Note that (2) and (6) imply .L ix /L
j
x ' R
j /R i ' h i /h j 2"f
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The higher discount rate h, the higher the required rate of return and the more profitable
firms' R&D projects should be for a given growth rate. This requires a larger firm size (Lx
i)
so that the knowledge stock of the firm can be applied at a larger scale, or a higher
productivity of R&D (Ri). 
As can be seen from (6), RiLx
i is the same in both countries in the steady state.
Moreover, since their growth rates are equal, the same applies to RiLR
i, see (1) and (2).
Note from (2) that Ri is lowest in the country with highest productivity. Hence, the high
productivity country will have a larger fraction of its labour force engaged in both
production of tradables (Lx) and research (LR). I.e. if h





Second, we combine (C.3) and (C.5) to characterize feasible growth as constrained
by labour market and balance of payments. In the steady state, feasible growth can be
written as:













high and if employment in R&D is large, see (1). The latter requires that a small fraction of
the labour force is employed in tradables production (see last term in (7)) and nontradables
production. A high real foreign debt (A/w<0) implies a high debt burden and low
consumption so that labour in the non-tradables sector is small (see second term in
brackets).








Higher productivity positively (negatively) affects a country's relative wages if g!1>2"f
(g!1<2"f). Since export demand is elastic (g!1>0), increases in productivity translate into
higher earnings. However, large spillovers ("f) shift part of the rents to foreign workers.
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i/Ai/wi. The second equality in (9) characterizes the relationship between foreign
assets aw
i and the productivity ratio hi/hj. The LHS (RHS) of this equality is decreasing
(increasing) in the productivity ratio. The solid lines in Figure 1 depict both sides of the
equation for aw
i=0. The intersection is at hi/hj=1, implying a symmetric steady state
solution. The broken lines in Figure 1 represent the case where country i has a debt
(aw
i<0): the LHS-curve (RHS-curve) shifts up (down) relative to the case with zero net
foreign assets. The result is a higher productivity ratio. This shows that net foreign assets




Under balanced trade the net foreign asset position is zero. The backward country
catches up fully and in the steady state both countries attain the same productivity level in
the tradables sector. The situation is different in case of capital mobility. In the steady state,
debtor countries are technological leaders, while creditor countries' productivity is
relatively low.  
Countries that accumulate foreign debts are typically those with many investment
opportunities as the result of catch up potential. As we will show in the next sections, the
country that initially lags behind and gains access to the international capital market
becomes indebted and leapfrogs. Intuitively, the rate of return is initially higher in the
backward country. Therefore, capital flows from the leading country towards the backward
country.
Leapfrogging is due to the existence of a non-tradables sector. For F=1 the steady
state level of hi/h j is unity regardless of the amount of foreign debt, see (9). Consider a
hypothetical steady state in which country 1 has higher productivity than country 2 despite
the fact that F=1. The former would charge lower prices and employ more labour in the
tradables sector than the latter. As a result, growth would be lower in country 1 than in




2. But unequal growth
rates imply that the situation cannot be a steady state. With non-tradables (F<1), the high
productivity country employs a large fraction of its labor force not only in production of
tradables but also in research. The country grows at the same rate as the low productivity
country since higher research labour input (LR
1>LR
2) is offset by lower research
productivity (R1<R2). More labour is available for tradables production and research since
labour engaged in non-tradables production is lower. Labour is shifted from the
nontradables sector to the production and research divisions of the export sector in order to
be able to service foreign debt. In other words, the debt burden accounts for lower
consumption, lower demand for non-tradables and a shift of labour to the investment sector,
resulting in a relatively higher level of productivity, compared to the creditor country.
The relation between growth and asset positions can also be derived from eq. (9). In
case of zero foreign debt (aw=0), implying h
i/h j=1 the rate of growth is equal to
     4 See appendix 1.
     5 The other parameters used in the numerical exercise are h=0.05, F=0.75, "h = 0.5,
>=0.015 and L=15. With these parameters we get g=ḡ irrespecive of aw if g = 1.2.
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(10)g ' $>L & h
"h%"f%$
If the tradables sector does not exist (F=$=1), the growth rate reduces to
(11)g' ' >L & h
"h%"f%1
Eq. (11) implies that in absence of a tradables sector the growth rate depends positively on
the productivity parameter of the R&D-division (>) and the common scale factor (L). The
growth rate depends negatively on the pure rate of time preference (h) and the significance
of knowledge spillovers ("h+"f). Under balanced trade and the existence of a tradables
sector formula (10) applies. The aggregate growth rate then depends positively on the
elasticity of substitution in the tradables sectors (g) and consumers’ preferences for
tradables (F).
Under perfect capital mobility the aggregate rate of growth (g) depends also on the
foreign asset position (aw) as appears from eq. (9). If the net foreign asset position differs
from zero the world rate of growth can be higher or lower than the rate of growth with
aw=0 depending upon the parameters of the model. It can be shown that a sufficient
condition for the growth rate under capital mobility to be lower than under balanced trade
is g!1 > 2"f. The opposite result g>ḡ requires g!1 < 2"f as a necessary condition.
4 In
Figure 3 these results are illustrated for "f = 0.25 and different values of g.
5 
Two opposing forces affect the growth rate. In the high productivity country (i.e.,
the debtor country), research productivity is lower but research employment is higher
compared to a situation without capital flows. The growth rate falls with international
capital flows if the latter force dominates, which happens if spillovers are relatively small
according to the condition g!1>2"f. In the steady state, the country with highest R&D
activity (LR) is the country with lowest national R&D productivity (R), viz. the debtor
country. Without international spillovers, this is clearly an inefficient distribution of world





















However, if international spillovers are important, world growth may benefit from a
country investing a lot in R&D, despite the fact that national research productivity in this
country is low, since spillovers raise world research productivity. Indeed, if 2"f >g!1,
growth may be positively related to world imbalances in financial wealth. If g is small, the
debtor country suffers from a large terms of trade decline associated with its technological
lead. A large shift in labour allocation from nontradables to tradables is needed to generate
sufficient export earnings to service its debt. International knowledge spillovers also have
adverse effects on the debtor country's income. If "f is high, it is difficult to improve its
competitive position since any increase in national productivity also benefits foreign
producers. Hence, if g is small relative to "f, the debtor country is forced to invest a lot in
knowledge accumulation and the creditor country is able to increase nontradables
consumption without adverse effects on its growth rate. Both forces lead to a higher world
growth rate. 
     6 Hence, x̃/dx/x. The only exception is variable ã which relates to absolute difference from
the steady state, ã/da, because in the symmetric equilibrium a = 0. Because we linearize around a
steady state in which p1=p2=1 for all t, we have dp̂i= .p̃@ i
     7 Once  is solved, we can solve for  by integrating g̃i over t. h̃ i& h̃ j h̃ i
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4. On the dynamics of catching up
In the previous section we studied the relation between foreign debt, productivity and
growth in the steady state, without determining the equilibrium levels of these variables
separately. In this section we will show that we need to study the entire transitional
dynamics the find the steady state values. 
To study the dynamics of the model it is convenient to linearize around the steady
state in case of symmetry (h 1/h 2 = 1, aw = 0). The key relationships in linearized form are
presented in Table D. The equations correspond with the key relationships in the original
model, Table C. Variables with a tilde relate to percentage deviations from their
hypothetical steady state value.6 Tilded variables depend on the time index t which is
omitted where possible. Variables without a tilde relate to the solutions in the symmetric
steady state. We have rewritten the Ramsey rule in terms of z / C/hF because this variable
is constant in the steady state. For the same reason we have substituted a/A/h in the
equation for the balance of payments.
The table contains 12 equations. We concentrate on the solution for the following 15
variables: - , and pi for i=1,2, and . To close thez̃ i, r̃ i p̃@ i g̃ i , L̃ ix , L̃
i
Y , ã
i h̃ 1& h̃ 2
model we need three additional equations. First, our choice of numeraire implies p̃2=0.
Next, note that we solve for the productivity ratio h i/h j, rather than the individual
productivity levels of the two countries. The reason is that the former is constant in the
steady state, while the latter are not.7 The following identity provides an additional
equation: 
, (12)h̃
@ r ' g g̃ 1& g̃ 2
where h r/h 1/h 2, so that / . Finally, we use the linearized equivalents of (3):h̃ r h̃ 1& h̃ 2
r̃ 1 = r̃ 2  (capital mobility)   or    ã 1 = 0  (balanced trade) (13)
The system of reduced-form equation in Table D can be solved analysing country
differences (x̃r/x̃1!x̃2) and country summations (x̃s/x̃1+x̃2) separately. The former decribe
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how a certain variable in country 1 deviates from that in country 2 (recall that all tilded
variables are deviations from a situation in which the countries are identical). The
summation variables relate to the integrated world economy and are useful as an
intermediate step in calculating the variables for separate countries, because by definition:
x̃1=(x̃r+x̃s)/2 and x̃2=(x̃r!x̃s)/2.
Table D Key relationships in linearized model
Ramsey rule
i=1,2 (D.1)z̃" i ' rr̃ i & p̃" i & gg̃ i % F
2
p̃" i & p̃" j
where z / C/hF
Investment decision
i=1,2 (D.2)>Lx "f (h̃
j
& h̃ i) % L̃ ix % (1&"h)gg̃
i & "fgg̃




Y % >Lx L̃
i
x % gg̃
i % "fg (h̃
i
& h̃ j) ' 0
Equilibrium in the market for non-tradables 










Y % h ã
i ' ã@ i
where a / A/h
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Equilibrium in market for tradables
(D.6)p̃ i & p̃ j ' & 1
g
(h̃ i & h̃ j % L̃ ix & L̃
j
x )
Equilibrium in the market for foreign bonds
(D.7)ã i ' & ã j
In all equations jÖi.
     8 We have used >Lx=h+("f+"h)g from (2) and (6) to simplify the element on the second
row, first column of the matrix.
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4.1. Balanced trade
The reduced-form model in differences can be compressed to a system of two differential
equation in and . The dynamic equation for  can be derived from eqs. (12),h̃ r L̃ rx h̃
r
(D.3), (D.5), (D.7), and (13). The dynamic equation in  is found from eqs. (D.1),L̃ rx













The determinant of the matrix in (14) is negative. Therefore, the system of differential
equations in country differences is saddle-point stable. The corresponding phase diagram is
drawn in Figure 4. As appears from eqs. (14) the  locus slopes upward and theh̃
" r
' 0
 locus slopes downward. The stable arm of the saddle path is indicated by theL̃
" r
x ' 0
broken line. If country 1 relatively backward we have . Then the system jumpsh̃ r (0)<0
to the stable arm at t = 0. The backward economy employs less labour in the production of
tradables than the leading country. The same applies to employment in nontradables (note
that (D.5) implies  under balanced trade). Therefore, the backward country allocatesL̃Y' L̃x
relatively more labour in the R&D division which boosts growth. After t=0, the variables
and  adjust gradually along the stable arm as indicated in Figure 4. In the longh̃ r L̃ rx
run there is complete catching up, , and both countries' productivityh̃ r (4)' L̃ rx (4)'0
expands at the same rate.
4.2. Capital mobility
Under perfect capital mobility eq. (13) applies, so that r̃ r=0. Taking differences with
respect to eq. (D.1) then results in:
. (15)z̃" r ' &(1&F) p̃" r & h̃
" r
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Eq. (15) implies that the system of differential equations obtained from Table D by taking
differences has a zero root. The model exhibits hysteresis: we need to know the entire
transition dynamics to solve for the steady state. 
The information contained in eq. (15) can be applied by integrating the equation to
obtain:
, (16)z̃ r ' ṽ & (1&F) p̃ r & h̃ r
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Figure 4
where ṽ is a constant of integration, which can be solved from the initial conditions of the
dynamic model.
The model is given by (16), (D.2)-(D.7), and (13) and can be reduced to the






















µ11 = >Lx + >LY ! 2"fg
µ12 = >gLx + >LY > 0
µ21 = ("h!"f)µ11 ! >LY + 2"f (>Lx + g) 
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µ22 = ("h!"f)µ12 ! >LY 
µ32 = !(g!1)Lx
The sub-system in  and is self-contained and saddlepoint stable if the determinanth̃ r p̃ r
of the relevant matrix ()) is negative. From eqs. (17) we find:
) = >Lx [ (g!1!2"f)>LY ! 2"fg(>Lx+g) ] (18)
It will be assumed that )<0. A sufficient condition for this to be true is (g!1!2"f) < 0.
More in general, the determinant will be negative for sufficiently small values of LY. If the
non-tradables sector is non-existent, we always have saddlepoint stability. The first two
differential equations can be used to solve for and in terms of ṽ and .h̃ r p̃ r h̃ r (0)
This yields:
, (19)h̃ r(t) ' (1&e &8t) h̃ r(0) % e &8t h̃ r(4)
, (20)h̃ r(4) ' & g
&)/>Lx
>LY ṽ
, (21)p̃ r(t) ' (1&e &8t) p̃ r(0) % e &8t p̃ r(4)




, (23)p̃ r(0) '
8p̃ r(4) & (1&"h%"f)>LYṽ & µ21h̃
r(0)
8%µ22
where 8 is the absolute value of the negative root of the relevant sub-matrix. Substitution of
(21) in the third differential equation in (17) yields:
. (24)ã
" r(t) ' µ32 p̃
r (4) % e &8t p̃ r(0) & p̃ r(4) % h ã r & Lx ṽ
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Lx ṽ & µ32 p̃
r(4)
h
The state variable ãr is predetermined, so that ãr(0) is given. Consequently, by setting t=0
and substituting (22) and (23), eq. (25) can be used to express ṽ in terms of ãr(0) and
. h̃ r (0)
Summarizing, we find that the long-run solution depends on ṽ, see (20), which in
turn depends on initial conditions. This clearly points out that the model exhibits hysteresis.
Further implications are derived from the numerical examples in the next section.
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4.3. The integrated world economy
Next we turn to the system of summation for a symmetrical world applying eqs. (D.1) -
(D.7). It is straightforward to show that the system can be reduced to a single differential












The differential equation (26) is unstable, so that the only viable solution under perfect




invariant over time. There is no inertia in the closed economy, obtained by summation of
country variables. In this world the steady state is attained instantaneously. As g̃s=0, the
summation of knowledge levels must be equal to the summation of the initial deviations
from the symmetrical steady state level: .h̃ s (t)' h̃ s (0) œt
The solutions for country variables (x̃ i) follow from combining x̃r and x̃s. For







knowledge levels in both countries are calculated as h̃ 1' (h̃ s (0)% h̃ r ) /2
and . Both and are predetermined. In order to model countryh̃ 2' (h̃ s (0)& h̃ r ) /2 h̃ r h̃ s
1 as the less developed country, we impose . In contrast, can be chosenh̃ r (0)<0 h̃ s (0)
arbitrarily. The reason is that all variables of the linearized model are calculated as
deviations from a steady state that is purely hypothetical. It does not make much sense,
however, to analyse country deviations from the hypothetical steady state in isolation.
Instead, we compare the results for individual countries in case of capital mobility with
those in case of balanced trade.
5. Numerical examples
In this section we present numerical results applying to the linearized model. First, we
discuss catching up in case of balanced trade and in case of capital mobility for a
benchmark case. Second, we investigate the sensitivity of the results for changes in
parameter values. In this connection special attention will be paid to the welfare
consequences of the choice made with respect to the balance of payments regime. The
parameters used in the benchmark case are equal to
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h = 0.05, F = 0.75, g = 2.5, "h = 0.5, "f = 0.25, > = 0.01
L = 15, aw = 0
The time paths of the variables are monotonic. It is therefore sufficient to present results
for t = 0 and t = 4, alongside with the speed of convergence for the system, 8. In all cases
considered we assume h̃ r'&1.
5.1. The benchmark case
The results for the benchmark case are presented from different angles in Tables 1 and 2.
In Table 1 the variables in differences with respect to countries 1 and 2 are shown for the
case of balanced trade as well as the case of perfect capital mobility. Table 2 gives the
outcomes for the two countries (i = 1, 2) as a difference between the results under capital
mobility and balanced trade. In both tables the hypothetical steady state to which the
variables in percentage deviations relate is eliminated by construction. It is therefore
possible to compare both balance of payments regimes.
Under balanced trade the model attains a symmetric steady state in the long run.
This explains the zeros in the second column of Table 1. The backward country (which is
country 1) catches up fully. At t = 0 this country starts with a productivity level that falls
short of the productivity level of the leading country by 1 percent. This is shown in the first
column of Table 1. Initially the rate of return is higher in the backward country. This
implies that more will be invested in R&D. The growth rate at t = 0 is higher in country
one, so that there is a clear case of catching up. The extra labour required in the R&D
division comes from the production of tradables and non-tradables in the same proportion.
Because country 1 is the backward nation its consumption level in the initial situation is
lower than that in the leading economy. Tradables produced in country 1 are initially
expensive, because of the relatively low productivity level.
Under perfect capital mobility the (nominal) rate of interest is equalized across
countries which explains the zeros in the third and fourth column of Table 1.The levelling
of interest rates is brought forth by an inflow of capital in country 1. As a result this
country builds up foreign debt, which is reflected in the net foreign asset position of  both
countries in the long run (t = 4). Comparing both regimes (Table 2) we see that the rate of
growth is now higher in country 1 and lower in country 2. Catching up proceeds slightly
faster: the rate of convergence under capital mobility equals 8 = 4.404%, whereas under
balanced trade we get 8 = 4.308%. The main implication of a higher growth rate in case of
capital mobility is, however, that country 1 overtakes country 2 in productivity levels. In
the long run the productivity level of country 1 exceeds that of country 2 as appears from
both tables.
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The labour required for speeding up R&D comes from the production division of
tradables and not from the non-tradables sector. The situation is now different compared
with balanced trade. Foreign borrowing allows consumption smoothing in the backward
country. To meet consumption demand tradables can be imported, but non-tradables have
to be produced at home. In the long run the bill has to be paid. Foreign debt has to be
serviced and there is a lower consumption level than under balanced trade. But then there is
also less need to produce non-tradables in country 1, so that more labour is available for the
production and export of tradables. It is the reallocation of labour from the non-tradables
sector to the tradables sector in the course of time which also induces leapfrogging. During
the process of adjustment towards the steady state extra labour is allocated to R&D under
capital mobility compared with balanced trade.
Table 1 Catching up: country differences
Case Balanced trade Capital mobility
Period
Variable t = 0 t = 4 t = 0 t = 4
Growth rate g̃r
Consumption C̃ r
Labour tradables L̃ rx
Labour non-tradables L̃ rY
Productivity h̃ r



































Table 2 Catching up: regime differences
Case Country 1 Country 2
Period
Variable t = 0 t = 4 t = 0 t = 4




Labour tradables L̃ ix
Labour non-tradables L̃ iY
Productivity h̃ i
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The results in Table 2 give rise to additional observations. First, it turns out that the
outcomes for country 2 are the exact opposite of those of country 1 with two exceptions.
The price of tradables does not change in country 2 because our choice of the numéraire.
The nominal interest rate is another exception. That the country results are mirror images
can be explained by the fact that the summations of variables are time-invariant under both
balance of payments regimes as observed above. This does not hold for the nominal interest
rate, because in case of capital mobility interest rates are uniform across countries.
Second, intertemporal welfare or lifetime utility at t=0 as defined in (A.4)9 is
higher for country 1 and lower for country 2 under capital mobility in comparison with
balanced trade. This is atypical as one would expect capital mobility to be welfare
improving as it opens the possibility of consumption smoothing. Moreover, capital mobility
has a uniform impact on both countries by affecting the steady state growth rate as
discussed in Section 3. However, both effects are of second order in the linear
approximations around a symmetrical steady state. What remains is the impact of
knowledge spillovers in both countries. Under capital mobility country 1 grows faster and
country 2 grows slower than under balanced trade. Domestic knowledge spillovers imply
underinvestment from a welfare point of view. Capital mobility mitigates this effect in
country 1 but aggrevates it in country 2. Cross-country spillovers have an opposite effect.
The returns to innovation undertaken by one country accrue partly to its trading partner,
thereby deteriorating its competitive position. Hence, foreign spillovers result in
overinvestment from the point of national welfare. Capital mobility aggrevates
overinvestment in country one. Sensitivity analysis is required to see whether the result
presented in Table 2 is robust or not.
     10 Figure 5b plots how much intertemporal welfare in country 1, , is higher underU 1 (0)
capital mobility than under balanced trade. We calculate this as the difference between
under capital mobiltiy and under balanced trade (see appendix 3). Ũ 1 (0) Ũ 1 (0)
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5.2. The role of the non-tradables sector
The results with respect to leapfrogging crucially depend on the existence of a non-
tradables sector. The sensitivity of the results for changes in F is shown in Figures 5a and
5b. The other parameters are the same as in the benchmark case. As before, the
productivity level in country 1 is one percent below that of country 2 in the initial situation.
As F increases the difference in long-run productivity levels declines as shown in the upper
panel of Figure 5a. At the same time long-run debt incurred by country 1 declines, but
never approaches zero. Unequal rates of return on investment in R&D induce international
capital flows also in the absence of a non-tradables sector. However, the larger the non-
tradables sector the more debt is accumulated in country 1 (lower panel of Figure 5a).
Diminishing returns with respect to investment in R&D are less severe if labour can be
reallocated from non-tradables to tradables production.
      
          Figure 5a    Figure 5b10
In Figure 5b we present the difference in lifetime welfare in case of capital mobility
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magnitude but opposite in sign). The difference is positive and increasing in F. Capital

















must be seen in connection with the foreign spillover parameter "f. In Figure 6 we vary "h
and stick to "f=0.25 (the benchmark value). On the vertical axis we measure again the
difference in welfare between both balance-of-payments regimes for country 1. There is no
non-tradables sector: F=1. Moreover, deviating from the logarithmic sub-utility function in
eqs. (A.4) we consider other cases of risk-aversion by introducing a sub-utility function
with a constant relative rate of risk-aversion (D). This change has a substantial impact on
the algebra of the model, but here we only present numerical result. 
In case of a logarithmic function (D=1) intertemporal utility is higher under capital
mobility as long as "h > "f (= 0.25). If domestic spillovers are relatively more important
than foreign spillovers, underinvestment from a national perspective arises. Capital
mobility stimulates investment and improves national welfare in the backward country.
However, if foreign spillovers are relatively more important, country 2 gains from the
rapid growth in country 1 and it is its welfare that rises. 
     11 Indeed, we find that 8 increases in D under capital mobility (for "h=0.5, we find 8 =
8.417%, 8.427%, 8.461% for D = 0.9, 1.0, 1.5 respectively). However, under balanced trade, 8
falls with D (for "h=0.5, we find 8 = 5.264%, 5.047%, 4.186% for D = 0.9, 1.0, 1.5
respectively). Higher risk aversion decreases intertemporal substitution and therefore reduces the
speed of convergence over time. Consumers prefer to smooth consumption more and national
savings are lower. Under balanced trade, national investment is lower accordingly which slows
down convergence between the two countries. However, under capital mobility, international
capital flows are required to equalize international rates of return. With lower national savings,
international capital flows are relatively larger so that the difference in national investment rates







Different attitudes with respect to risk-aversion have a substantial impact as shown
in Figure 6. If consumers are relatively risk-avers (for instance D=1.5) consumption
smoothing becomes relatively important. Consumers welcome the opportunity to spread
their risk very much. Capital mobility provides this opportunity. As a consequence,
convergence is faster under capital mobility if risk aversion is higher.11 This means that
foreign spillovers that arise from unequal productivity levels play less of a role, which
stimulates the welfare gains from capital mobility for country one. The opposite result
holds in case of less risk-avers consumers, as shown in Figure 6 for D=0.9.
6. Conclusions
Capital mobility speeds up international convergence of per capita output levels. In the
neoclassical model there is even an immediate equalization of output levels per worker
across countries. Restrictions on international mobility of financial capital or introduction
of adjustment costs in the accumulation of augmentable factors of production mitigate the
extreme neoclassical case. In our two-sector two-country model we stress the importance of
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firm-specific knowledge which must be acquired by investing in R&D. Therefore, even
under perfect mobility of financial capital it takes time to fully catch up.
More important, we show that the country that is initially backward in terms of
knowledge levels leapfrogs the initially leading country if non-tradables are taken into
account. The backward country incurs foreign debt to smooth consumption over time.
Consumption in the short run is higher at the expense of consumption later on. Non-
tradables are part of total consumption. The fall in consumption of non-tradables sets free
labour which can be allocated in the tradables sector to increase export production and
R&D. The result is that the knowledge level in the once backward country overtakes that in
the formerly leading country. 
Spillovers of knowledge foster economic growth in the world economy. In our
model knowledge spillovers imply constant returns on world-wide level with respect to
augmentable factors of production and long-run economic growth is endogenous for the
world as a whole. 
The results places the convergence literature in a different perspective. Long-run
growth of the global economy as well as relative cross-country productivity levels are path-
dependent and depend on the initial distribution of financial wealth across countries.
International financial market institutions matter not only for the speed of convergence but
also for the long-run distribution of productivity. The openness of the economy, as
measured by the relative size of the tradables sector, plays a key role in the processes of
convergence and leapfrogging. 
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Appendix
1. Sufficient conditions for g declining in #aw#























h (h r)"f $
h % ($%"f%"h)g
> 0
Now we make use of the fact that hr and aw are negatively related and that symmetry (h
r=1)
arises if net foreign assets are zero (aw=0). If g!1>2"f, then R>0 and 
,h r ' 1 ¸ aw ' 0 Y dgdaw
' 0
,h r > 1 ¸ aw < 0 Y dgdaw
< 0
.h r < 1 ¸ aw > 0 Y dgdaw
< 0
Hence, aw=0 yields a maximum for g if g!1>2"f. ~
2. Some notes on the linearization procedure
Our linearization procedure involves taking total differentiation, where all parameters are
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considered as constants. Tilded variables are expressed as relative deviations from the
initial balanced growth path, i.e. for any variable u, ũ/du/u or du=uũ. Non-tilded
variables that show up in the linearized model refer to steady state values. When linearizing
the time derivatives of variables in the original model, we should make the distinction
between variables that are constant in the steady state (stationay variables) and those which
are not. For the latter we can easily take the total differential in terms of growth rates, e.g.
dĥ=dg=gg̃. In contrast, for the time derivative of a stationary variable, say us, we have
dûs= . An exception is ã which is defined as the absolute (rather than relative) deviationũ
@
s
from the original growth path, i.e. ã/da and d 0a= , which allows us to consider theã@
situation in which A=a=0 initially (balanced trade).
Given the above procedure, (D.2), (D.3), (D.6) and (D.7) directly follow from their
equivalent in Table C. This appendix explains how to derive the remaining equations.
To derive (D.1) from (C.1), first note that the LHS of (C.1) can be written as
ẑ+Fĥ. The total derivative of this expression reads:
.d Ĉ ' z̃@ % Fgg̃
By our choice of numeraire, prices are constant in the long run. Moreover, we linearize
around a symmetric steady state so that s=0.5. Therefore total derivative of the consumer
price inflation can be written as: 




@ i ' (1&F)gg̃ i % (F/2) (p̃
@ j& p̃
@ i)
Using the last two results, we straightforwardly find (D.1).
To derive (D.4), we use the definition of z/C/hF and the following expression of the
consumer price index that follows from subsequent linearization and substitution of (B.7),
(B.6), (B.11), and (B.8):
. p̃ ic & p̃
i ' (1&F) h̃ i % (F/2) (p̃ j& p̃ i)
Finally we derive (D.5). Dividing (B.12) by hi and using (A.2) to eliminate X, we
find:
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.p iL ix & FC
ip ic /h
i ' ( Â i&p̂ i) & (r i&p̂ i) A i /h i
Using the definition a/A/h, we may rewrite the RHS as 0a!(r!g)a. Total differentiation of
the result gives:
.pLx(p̃%L̃x) & (FCpc/h)(C̃%p̃c& h̃) ' ã
@
& a(rr̃&gg̃) & (r&g)ã
From (C.4) we find . We linearize around a steady state characterizedC̃ % p̃ & h̃ ' L̃Y % p̃
by balanced trade. Hence, we can set a=0 and FCpc/h=NLx. Furthermore, r!g=h, which
follows from (C.1), (4) and (5). Substitution of these results yields (D.5).
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3. Welfare
Welfare at time t [see (A.4)] can be written as:









Hence, welfare depends on the time path of consumption, captured by C(0) and  .Ĉ
Taking total differentials, solving the resulting integrals by using the fact that all variables
develop monotonically with speed of adjustment 8 and denoting the growth rate of
consumption by gc, we derive:











Note that , so that gc=Fg in the steady state and Ĉ' ẑ%Fĥ
,g̃c(t) '
8 z̃(t) & z̃(4)
Fg
% g̃(t)
where the numerator of the first term on the RHS represents .z̃@(t)
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